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Introduction
While trying to translate the first verse of St. John’s Gospel, in a way 
which could capture the active character of the Logos in creation, Goethe’s 
Dr. Faust, just before his first encounter with Mephistopheles, arrived at 
a formulation that anticipated the philosophical transformations to come 
and that encapsulates a leit motiv of contemporary social thinking: “Im 
Anfang war die Tat!” (In the Beginning was the Deed!) (Goethe 1898, 50). 
This translation aimed at expressing the dynamic power of the Logos that 
everything “works and creates”. Contrary to this, Faust’s sentence has 
become a presupposition of contemporary thought according to which there 
is no meaning beyond human production, and thus, no meaning that is not 
purely contingent. The human world is certainly a meaningful universe, but 
its origin and foundation, whether we talk about religious narratives, value 
systems, social configurations, scientific theories or even human features 
and dispositions, is to be found neither in the “order of things”, nor in 
human nature or divine revelation, but in a sort of self-constitutive activity 
by means of which human beings construct themselves and their worlds. 
This fundamental insight of socio-constructionist theories in contempo-
rary social sciences and humanities seems to pose a challenge to Christian 
anthropology. For being created in the image and likeness of God implies 
that human life receives its meaning, shape and orientation from a source 
other than mere human activity and creativity. This means that there is 
a fundamental order of meaning that, even if it can never be fully expressed 
by means of human concepts and language, is communicated to human 
beings as a way of grounding of our humanity. The Logos, then, cannot be 
merely a human production, as socio-constructionism claims. It has to be, 
on the contrary, that which, as a source of transcendent divine meaning, 
makes possible every human creation. 
Can this transcendent shaping power of the Logos be made under-
standable in the contemporary intellectual scenery, so deeply determined 
by socio-constructionist insights? I want to argue that the idea of social 
construction offers a relevant place for the dialogue between Christian 
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thought and contemporary social sciences. This dialogue can help both to 
understand better the historical character of human beings and to limit and 
redirect the radical insight of socio-constructionism, in a way that avoids 
the insurmountable problems to which it seems to lead. I will suggest that 
the socio-constructionist account of the origin of meaning not only leads 
to serious inconsistencies, but that it presupposes a pre-existing order of 
meaning in which we can discover the sign of the transcendent character of 
the Logos and the active presence of the Spirit, which makes possible and 
guides human historical and contingent participation in reality. 
1. The beginning as the invention of foundations 
The idea of social construction forms part of an attempt to overcome a pre-
vious image of knowledge, society, humanity and the world based on the 
assumption that there exists an independent reality that can be discovered 
and described objectively, from a universal point of view detached from all 
values, interests and interpretations, as well as a universal human nature 
which can ground moral principles and social configurations. This idea 
radicalizes what in the turn from the 19th to the 20th century was called 
“historical consciousness”, to the point that the diversity and permanent 
transformation of worldviews, religions and cultures comes to be seen as 
an indication that proves that all what counts as real and natural is so only 
within entirely contingent forms of life and discursive schemes. Indeed, 
the core insight behind the claim that something is socially constructed is 
that that which appears as purely given, natural and inevitable “need not 
have existed, or need not be at all as it is [since it] is not determined by the 
nature of things” (Hacking 1999, 6; cf. Burr 2003, 45). 
What exactly it means to be socially constructed, how the construction 
is carried out, which ontological status socially constructed things enjoy 
and what political consequences the whole constructionist discourse has 
are issues that differ in different socio-constructionist theories. However, 
the metaphor of construction always involves the idea that at the origin of 
what counts as real and human activity plays the primordial part. Ways of 
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knowing, language, discourse and practice constitute reality rather than 
discover, represent or ground themselves in it. The point is not, of course, 
that our words, concepts and beliefs about the world (social or natural) are 
socially constructed, in the sense that they are inescapably historically 
and culturally shaped, but that since they are so, they cannot refer to any 
extra-cultural reality. That means that there is no way to discriminate 
between our beliefs and the external world to which they are supposed to 
correspond. 
This conclusion, interestingly, represents a problematic move from 
epistemology to ontology, typical of socio-constructionism (cf. Smith 2010, 
152). The full argument appears clearly in the following passage by Nelson 
Goodman, who in this regard comes very close to radical socio-construc-
tionism: 
Frames of reference […] seem to belong less to what is described than to a system 
of description […] If I ask about the world, you can offer to tell me how it is 
under one or more frames of reference; but if I insist that you tell me how it is 
apart from all frames, what can you say? We are confined to ways of describing 
whatever is described. Our universe, so to speak, consists of these ways rather 
than of a world. (1978, 3)
There is no direct access to the world. All we can say and experience is 
mediated through our conceptual systems and ways of seeing, which are 
culturally and historically determined. But, – and here is where the move 
becomes problematic– from this extensively held position, the conclusion 
is drawn that our concepts and beliefs do not refer to any extra conceptual 
reality, because they themselves constitute reality. This step resembles 
George Berkeley’s master argument for idealism (cf. [1710] 1982, §22, 23; 
Hacking 1999, 24). What would be the world independently of our ways of 
knowing and our forms of life? This is, literally, unthinkable. Because every 
time we conceive of an aspect of reality we conceptualize it, and this implies 
the use of certain concepts, a particular language and frame of reference. 
Then a reality independent of our conceptualizations is well beyond our 
reach. It does not even make sense as a regulative hypothesis. “When we strip 
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off as layers of convention all differences among ways of describing it, what 
is left? The onion is peeled down to its empty core.” (Goodman 1978, 118)
Or to put it in another famous anti-realist argument: truth cannot be 
a relationship of correspondence between our descriptions and beliefs 
about the world and some independent facts, because there is no way to 
establish the facts that would make true our beliefs without “constructing” 
the facts using the same beliefs that we want to evaluate. We cannot stand 
outside our language, conceptual schemes and modes of knowing in order 
to corroborate the correspondence between them and an external reality. 
A fact –according to the very etymology of the word– is something made, 
a product of our interpreting and not its support. Truth has to do only with 
the internal coherence and practical usefulness of our theories, which are 
ways of structuring the world for our needs, interests and actions. (cf. Gergen 
2001, 54, 72, 154; Von Glasersfeld 1984; Rorty 1989, 5ss).
In a word, contingency, as one of the main characteristics of that which 
is claimed to have been socially constructed, implies three interrelated 
ontological theses: (1) what is constructed owes its existence to a particular 
and transitory language, culture or conceptual scheme which, unable to 
correspond to the way things are, constitutes them to serve particular needs 
and interests; therefore, (2) what is constructed is not necessary or inevitable 
and lacks any immutable essence; and (3) it somehow depends on human 
volition and activity to construct, deconstruct and reconstruct reality.
In this regard, Stephen Turner has adequately pointed out in his study 
of the theories of practice that: 
In postfoundationalist writings in the humanities, the diversity of human 
practices has become a place-holder or filler in the slot formerly occupied 
by the traditional ‘foundationalist’ notions of truth, validity and interpretive 
correctness. Truth, validity and correctness are held to be practice-relative rather 
than practice-justifying notions. Where we used to say that our practices, for 
example in science, were justified by the fact that they led us to truth, now we 
can see that truth is only that which our practices of representation enable us 
to construct as true. […] If practices are diverse and therefore ‘local’, then truth 
and validity are themselves local […] [and] ‘socially constructed.’” (1994, 9)
6(1)/201858
CA R LO S M I G U E L G Ó M E Z
Thus, to claim that the horizons of meaning in which we dwell are social 
constructions means that they have no foundation deeper than or beyond 
human activity. As an attempt to overcome foundationalism, this should 
mean that they are not derived from or justified by appeal to a first basic 
belief or principle, self-evident for “all rational beings” or objectively given 
to the cognitive apparatus. On the contrary, truth, validity, correctness 
and all other normative criteria are not only internal to particular systems 
and worldviews, but they are arbitrary with respect to the world (or rather 
they are equally valid ways of constructing the world without reference to 
any non-constructed reality). Foucault, for example, following Nietzsche 
([1873] 2010), has attempted to show that truth, knowledge, the epistemic 
subject and the like are “invented” through social practices, which means 
that rather than an origin in human nature or the world they have a small, 
low, mean and unavowable beginning in dark power relations (cf. 2002, 7).
Surely, the linear image of rationality and knowledge typical of classic 
foundationalism is problematic and inadequate in many respects. But this 
does not lead to the radical conclusions of socio-constructionists. In partic-
ular, the ontological conclusion derived from the awareness of our finitude 
simply does not follow. Not only does the historical character of a concept 
not imply that it cannot refer to anything extra-conceptual, as if language, 
discursive practices and forms of life were walls that separated us from the 
world (1.1.); but also, the step from the perspective character of every cog-
nitive activity to the ontological conclusion of the constructed character of 
all reality leaves unresolved the very issues regarding the origin of meaning 
that it seemed to explain and cannot attain its liberating goals (1.2.). 
1.1. The priority of meaning in knowledge 
The basic principle of foundationalism, according to which a belief is justified 
(and thus constitutes knowledge) only if it can be inferentially based upon 
another justified belief, and thus up to a basic belief which should be able 
to demonstrate its self-evident truth, implies an indefensible view of the 
relationship between the knowing agent and the world. In particular, this 
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view of knowledge presupposes the idea of a disengaged agent (Taylor 1993). 
This is an agent whose primordial way of interacting with reality is cognitive; 
that is, through a set of operations that allow her to elaborate a picture of 
the world by means of the processing of bits of information taken from the 
surroundings, which in turn let themselves to be grasped and processed 
independently of any value, interest and purpose of the agent (Taylor 1993, 
320). Knowledge, for this view, could be safely grounded on the neutrality 
of the given and the objectivity of the process of checking and connecting 
beliefs, which depends on the careful exclusion of all prejudice and distor-
tion coming from the particular historical situation of the agent, as well as 
from her subjective constitution. On the one hand, the beliefs coming from 
tradition, based on authority rather than on methodical demonstration, and 
on the other hand, the feelings, interests and values of the agent represent 
prejudices that must be expelled in order to warrant objectivity. Rationality 
is linked thus to a method for inspecting and warranting beliefs, and the 
world is reduced to a constellation of objects from which all “secondary 
properties” are excluded as mere projections and illusory ways of being 
affected by the real, intrinsic properties of the objects. 
But neither would knowledge be possible independently of all situation 
and perspective, nor can the world be understood primarily as a collection 
of neutral objects. Both points have been extensively elaborated in contem-
porary thinking and here I can just remind the reader of some basic ideas, 
particularly those that seem conducive to socio-constructionist conclusions. 
The situated character of rationality and knowledge has been particularly 
explored in hermeneutics in a way that also reconstructs the idea of an 
objective world. Against both the Enlightenment ideal of a disengaged 
rationality and the positivist assumption of an absolute scientific method, 
authors in this school have shown that all scientific investigation and 
rational activity, as well as all our dealings with the world, presuppose as 
their condition of possibility a fore-understanding of that which is going to 
be studied and acted upon. The life world of meaningful experience in which 
the scientist moves and acts provides the framework for research. It is the 
“horizon of what in the given case is indubitably valid as existing […] [and 
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works] as the source of self-evidence, the source of verification.” (Husserl 
1970, 110, 126) This horizon of pregiven meanings is embodied in culture, 
tradition and forms of life. But this, far from representing a hindrance for 
true knowledge, makes it possible. This is so for two reasons.
Firstly, as Gadamer has shown, rationality cannot be understood as 
a method that requires the separation from traditional and cultural values 
and interpretations. On the contrary, it always needs to start and work 
with what is given in a tradition. All interpretation and rational activity is 
thus historical, insofar as it begins from something that has already been 
understood and is previous to all further thematization (Gadamer 1975, 268, 
278; cf. Heidegger 1963, § 32). This previous element of meaning Gadamer 
calls prejudices. But contrary to the Enlightenment’s understanding of 
them, prejudices are not necessarily false and distorted beliefs accepted 
on mere authority, which would negatively limit rational inquiry. Rather, 
they represent the way in which the tradition has interpreted the world, 
and their continuity and acceptance are not an act of blind obedience but 
of free rational assent (Gadamer 1975, 282). Now, prejudices can be false 
or true with respect to the thing that is interpreted in them (Gadamer 
1975, 281, 270). For that reason, understanding is always an open activity 
that starts from what is given in tradition but does not stop there. The 
horizon of fore-understanding is continuously transformed and enlarged 
by means of new interpretations. Accordingly, the historical character of 
rationality means not only that it is always situated, but also that it is open 
to permanent transformation, establishing new horizons of meaning that 
will be the basis for future interpretations. 
Secondly, the historicity of rationality, its embeddedness in tradition 
and culture, implies that the world for human beings cannot be understood 
primarily as a collection of value-free objects. The fore-understanding that 
constitutes the starting point and the condition of possibility of all rational 
activity is already a way in which the world is integrated as a meaningful 
whole. But this integration that takes the form of tradition is far from an 
arbitrary imposition of meaning on reality, as if it were an entirely passive raw 
material ready to be shaped by humans in all possible forms and directions. 
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Here is where socio-constructionists make a problematic move from the 
awareness of the historicity of all understanding to the conclusion that all 
reality is humanly constructed. For the organization of meaning in tradition 
is not something like the production of a picture that could be formed 
independently of our relation to the world, something as a representation 
made by a disembodied agent who could decide at will what to believe. On 
the contrary, the primordial form of fore-understanding is practical. It is 
embedded in our “skillful coping with the world”, because “at the most basic, 
preconceptual level, the understanding I have of the world is not simply one 
constructed or determined by me. It is a «coproduction» of me and the world” 
(Dreyfus and Taylor 2015, 93) – one that is shared by others, we should add. 
Accordingly, our understanding of the world is shaped by the values, 
beliefs and interpretations of the culture to which we belong, as well as 
by our interests and the practices in which our dealings with the world 
are structured. In this sense, there is, for us, no knowledge of the world 
independently from our interpretations, interests and forms of life. But the 
inverse is also truth. Our practices and interpretations cannot have the form 
they have and constitute a way of masterful dealing with the world unless 
the world manifests itself in them, allowing itself to be grasped in some of 
its aspects and modes of being. There can be no absolute knowledge of the 
world, because all knowledge entails the historical fore-understanding 
proper of certain particularly located mode of interaction with the world, 
but each interpretation is not an arbitrary invention of meaning. Meaning 
can only be the result of a practice because the practice is a skillful way 
of grasping and using for certain purposes certain aspects of its objects. 
Thus, our language, discursive practices and cultural conceptual schemes 
should not be understood as barriers that block our access to the real, but 
as the point of interaction and contact by means of which we participate 
in reality. All this allows for realist criteria of knowledge and truth, which 
also accept historicity (Gómez 2017). Evidently, certain purposes, interests 
and ways of seeing may deform and misuse reality, but this can only be 
said because reality resists certain uses and interpretations and frustrates 
many of our purposes. 
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1.2. The inscrutability of the origin of meaning  
and the unattainable promises of anti-essentialism 
In a basic and unproblematic sense for contemporary self-understanding, 
all of us become humans by means of being initiated in a particular world of 
meanings pre-existent to each individual. We all have to learn a language, 
form ourselves gradually as members of a particular sociocultural milieu, 
and, in general, become active participants in a particular life world. This 
implies learning to see and evaluate situations using certain values and 
principles, acquiring certain beliefs which work as tacit assumptions of 
our thought, and developing the skills and habits for skillfully coping with 
our particular culturally shaped environment. Clearly, the elements that 
compose the life world in which we are socialized and which determine the 
way in which every person thinks, feels and acts, have a historical character. 
They are not the same in every time and place, and we ourselves contribute 
to the permanent transformation of the horizon of fore-understanding, to 
use the technical term in hermeneutics, from which we interpret the world 
and our place in it (cf. Habermas 1981, 202, 211). So in this sense, a socially 
constructed world of meanings is at the origin of our becoming who we are, 
and human action is at the heart of the process of transforming life worlds. 
But beyond the notion of socialization, an infinite regress seems to be 
the fate of socio-constructionism. For no radical beginning is thinkable in its 
terms, since that would imply identifying something from which construc-
tion started, e.g. a first raw uninterpreted material (cf. Searle 1995, 55), or 
that which makes the construction possible, such as an anthropological or 
biological constant (cf. Berger y Luckman 1967, 49, 51), or a causal process 
lawfully regulated (cf. Elder-Vass 2012, 14). For this reason, socio-construc-
tionists prefer an infinite regress of constructions rather than “search for 
a universal or necessary beginning [that] is best left to theology” (Goodman 
1978, 7). More importantly, the socio-constructionist perspective has to 
understand itself as a social construction. This means that we cannot take 
it to refer to facts in the world, but as a way of producing those very facts.1 
1 Cf. Latour (1987, 17), according to whom “the settlement of a controversy is the cause of 
Nature’s representation, not its consequence”.
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But then, the fact that the facts about social construction are merely social 
constructions is also a social construction, and this new fact too and thus 
to infinity (Kukla 2000, 73).
Clearly, this presents a serious obvious problem regarding the epistemic 
validity of a radical socio-constructionist perspective. If it is as contingent 
as every other possible theory, why should we adopt this view? After all, 
it can only offer elements for (self-defeating) radical skepticism, but not 
an account of the dynamics of human historicity or a description of any 
“real” feature of the world (cf. Smith 2010, 136; Wolterstorff 2014, 37). 
Some socio-constructionists are aware of this problem and have tried to 
offer a response. Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, in their seminal, 
though certainly not a radical socio-constructionist book, The Construc-
tion of Social Reality, decide to leave aside this sort of issues, since “to 
include epistemological questions concerning the validity of sociological 
knowledge in the sociology of knowledge is somewhat like trying to push 
a bus in which one is riding.” (1967, 13) David Boor offers what may be the 
only possible solution to the dilemma, which implies a drastic departure 
from the radical socio-constructionist assumption that knowledge is not 
based on how things are since it is not representational but constitutive of 
reality. To affirm that knowledge is socially determined, that is, that it has 
social causes, does not imply to affirm that it cannot be true with respect 
to the world (Boor 1976, 14). Differently put, the fact that all our cognitive 
activities are situated and carried out using the particular conceptual and 
linguistic equipment of a culture does not mean, as we showed in the last 
section, that they constitute reality or that they are not forms of contact 
and interaction with an independent world. 
The infinite regress seems insuperable for social-constructionists 
without giving up some of their core radical insights. But proponents of 
socio-constructionist anti-foundationalism normally argue that their 
point has to do more with politics than with epistemology or ontology. The 
unmasking of something that seemed natural but now is seen as socially 
constructed is supposed to liberate us from its dominion and to transform 
the status quo, which has been created as a way to reproduce and expand 
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power relations (cf. Hacking 2000, 6, 53; Gergen 2001, 27). Anti-essentialism, 
thus, comes as a promise of liberation. 
This implies an additional premise in the socio-constructionist argu-
ment. It is not only that what is constructed is contingent insofar as it is not 
by nature, but there is also something wrong in all construction, something 
“small, low, mean and unavowable” (Foucault 2002, 7) in our beginning. 
It is power that produces us, exclusion, domination (cf. E.g. Butler 1995, 47; 
Hacking 1999, 6). Reality is not only contingent because it may have been 
otherwise, but it is very bad as it is. This is the real point and motivation 
of radical socio-constructionism, what Vivien Burr calls the “liberating 
promise of anti-essentialism”: “If what we take ourselves and others to be 
are constructions and not objective descriptions, and if it is human beings 
who have built these constructions, then it is (at least in principle) possible 
to re-construct ourselves in ways that might be more facilitating for us (….) 
it becomes possible to think not only of individuals re-construing aspects 
of themselves, but of re-thinking whole social categories, such as gender, 
sexuality, race, disability and illness”. (Burr 1998, 13; cf. Gergen 2001, 10) 
There are at least three points to note here. Firstly, this additional 
assumption of the dark forces behind social construction is certainly not 
an empirical observation. Despite the effort to reconstruct the historical 
processes of formation of concepts, practices, subjects and theories as if 
this proved the assumption, it is not something we discover when we look at 
history. Rather it works as a presupposition that directs the interpretation of 
historical events. It is a way of seeing history, which has different sources in 
ninetieth century thought. Clearly, there is a strong Marxist influence that 
generates the methodological supposition “that the most important forms 
of action or interaction for analytic purposes are those which take place 
in asymmetrical or dominated relations, that it is these forms of action or 
interaction that best explain the shape of any given system at any given time” 
(Ortner 1984, 147). The reception of Freud’s work also plays an important 
part in the constitution of the assumption, since he “let us see the moral 
consciousness as historically conditioned, a product as much of time and 
chance as of political or aesthetic consciousness.” (Rorty 1989, 30) Equally 
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so does Nietzsche, for whom the universe “is for all eternity chaos, not in the 
sense of a lack of necessity but of a lack of order” (2001, § 109), and “life aims 
at semblance, I mean error, cheating, dissembling, delusion, self-delusion”, 
so the will to truth is “a destructive principle hostile to life” (2001, § 344).
The point is that the assumption of an unavowable beginning of what 
is constructed comes very close to an implicit metaphysical presupposition 
about the nature of reality and in particular of the historical process. As such, 
it is not a conclusion of an argument, but the assumed beginning of a way 
of thinking. It cannot be demonstrated, because it grounds and limits all 
that can be meaningfully said once we have accepted it (cf. Collingwood 
2014). Here again, radical socio-constructionism faces a dilemma. For it 
is not clear how it can avoid generating an ontological commitment with 
a view of the historical process as essentially lead by power relations and 
with a notion of contingency that makes it look like a real property of the 
world, almost a substance endowed with causal properties, rather than with 
a lack of something, with the absence of foundations, or sufficient causes or 
determination (cf. Evers 2015, 222). But such an ontological commitment 
would be contradictory both with its anti-foundationalist aspirations and 
with its epistemological skepticism regarding the possibility of knowing how 
things really are. And again, if this basic assumption is only one possible 
interpretation of reality among many, why would we accept it? Because it 
is liberating? 
With this we arrive to the second problematic aspect of the pretended 
liberating character of the socio-constructionist view. Certainly, power 
is commonly exercised through discourse; certain interpretations and 
classifications construct people in a way that keeps them dominated and 
alienated. Racist, ethnocentric, colonialists, chauvinistic practices have 
normally been accompanied by justificatory discourses and ideologies that 
claim to be based on a description of how people, history, culture, knowledge 
or religion really are. This is a fact that must be always remembered and 
fought against. But, in order to identify certain practices and interpreta-
tions as deforming, alienating, dominating and the like we need to use 
criteria that can adjudicate over different culturally determined systems 
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of value and belief, in a way that does not impose on them alien principles. 
Obviously, if all normative criteria are merely contingent constructions in 
the socio-constructionist sense, that is, mean and suspicious strategies 
of domination, then no criticism or liberating promise is possible at all 
(cf. Smith 2010, 138). What dark interests does the liberating promise of 
anti-essentialism serve? – This is the question any sensitive, self-reflexive 
radical socio-constructionist should ask herself. 
The presumed authoritarianism of truth, universality and fixed essences 
cannot be overcome by unmasking the constructed character of all truth, 
universality and essence. On the contrary, “all that is left in this approach 
for the making of moral commitments are personal preference, arbitrary 
choice and power to enforce and impose.” (Smith 2010, 141) Precisely, the 
critical power of truth requires not only the awareness of the fallibility of 
human ways of knowing, theories and discourses, and thus it is compatible 
with pluralism, but also the moral commitment not to decide matters based 
on personal preferences, arbitrary choices and power impositions. It is in 
the search for what is beyond these that real and liberating criticism can 
be performed. 
Finally, the liberating promise faces an additional paradox. It has to 
do with the possibilities, presuppositions and limits of the enormous task 
of re-constructing oneself and the aspects of reality that were unmasked 
as social-constructions. This is certainly a capital task in all authentically 
human life. As existentialist authors pointed out, this lies at the heart of 
human responsibility, as well as of political and ethical life. But, how is the 
self-reconstructive job to be carried out by an entirely constructed subject 
by means of entirely constructed values, criteria, drives and inventions in 
a way that does not reproduce the very dark beginnings from which she 
wants to liberate herself? As in the case of the possibility of criticism, the 
possibility of a real liberating self-transformation requires the discovery 
of a different source of the self and reality that escapes construction and 
may well ground it. 
The discussion so far suggests that the metaphor of social construction 
leaves unresolved problems and conduces to multiple aporias, when it is 
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offered as an account of the origin and foundation of meaning. Something 
beyond construction is required for it to work. In order to track this sign 
of transcendence, we turn now to explore that which constitutes the very 
process of construction: the deed. 
2. The deed 
There is no consensus about how the process of social construction is 
carried out or what it is that constructs reality. The preferred candidates 
are culture, language, discourse and knowledge. We cannot explore them all 
here (cf. Elder-Vass, 2012), but it is important to note they have in common 
that all are considered as forms of practice. The concept of practice, which 
since the last decades of the twentieth century has become the cornerstone 
of social theories, is also multifaceted and polysemous. We can however 
identify some important features of this concept for our discussion: a practice 
is a habitualized pattern of actions, whose performative character has the 
causal power of shaping reality, the self and the social world in a way that 
situates contingency in the void left by essences, truth and permanent 
foundations after the collapse of foundationalism. 
Accordingly, practices are not mere sequences of action (e.g. instinctive 
or automatic), but rather constitute patterns of purposive, understandable 
behavior. In this sense, practices require the habitualization of certain 
actions and something like their codification. If this is so, how can practices 
be the core of the social construction of universes of meaning? Rather, they 
presuppose the meaningful order of the social world to which they belong, 
and which they contribute to reproduce and transform. This circularity of 
meaning, the fact that practices are already significant within a certain 
horizon of fore-understanding (whose construction they are supposed to 
explain), corresponds to the infinite regress in the beginning of constructions 
that we mentioned earlier. Berger and Luckmann’s influential theory of 
the construction of reality offers an interesting example of this circularity.
Certainly, the “reality” whose origin in social construction they are trying 
to show is not the whole of reality, but the “sense of reality”, that is, the 
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“quality appertaining to phenomena that we recognize as being independent 
of our own volition” (Berger and Luckmann 1967, 1), such as institutions, 
values and symbolic systems. Their theory, thus, is compatible with realist 
social science insofar as they differentiate the social from the natural world 
and accept there are certain anthropological and biological dispositions that 
are not constructed but make construction possible (world-openness, instinct 
under determination, plasticity, the need to externalization, sociability, 
linguistic capability, etc). But, their realist assumptions tend to be absorbed 
by the rest of the theory insofar as what counts as real cannot be determined 
independently of the forms of knowledge proper of a social group, which, 
in turn constitute the very sense of reality of the objects known. 
The circularity of meaning in Berger and Luckmann’s account of practice 
occurs in the following form. They offer a narrative of the origin of the social 
world, according to which, social reality is constructed in a process that goes 
from externalization to objectivation to internalization. Externalization is 
a sort of anthropological need to act in the external world, which has as its 
basis the original biological plasticity of human behavior. Contrary to what 
happens with other animals, the human relationship with the environment 
is open; this means that human action is not fixed by instinctual patterns 
but can acquire multiple forms and directions. This is so because the human 
organism is “very imperfectly structured by his own biological constitution”, 
and thus “man constructs his own nature, or more simply, […] man produces 
himself” (Berger and Luckmann 1967, 47, 49). But this self-production is 
always a social enterprise. Human beings must finish their ontogenetical 
development after they are born, in relationship to their specific social 
environment, which provides the stability to human conduct that it lacks 
due to is primordial plasticity (Berger and Luckmann 1967, 51). 
So, the point is that externalization cannot be at the beginning of the 
process of the construction of social reality because it needs the social 
order to work. On the one hand, the “Social order is not part of the «nature 
of things», and it cannot be derived from the «laws of nature». Social order 
exists only as a product of human activity.” (Berger and Luckmann 1967, 52) 
And on the other, human activity needs the social order to “specialize 
6(1)/2018 69
I N T H E B E G I N N I N G WA S T H E D E E D. . .
and direct his drives” (Berger and Luckmann 1967, 52). It is true that the 
authors insist that the relationship between human beings and society is 
dialectical insofar as each is a product of the other, and thus, again, no radical 
beginning of society in a non-social state of humanity is thinkable. But, 
simultaneously, the theory wants to explain how it is that social reality is 
a product of human action. The point is not only how reality is reproduced, 
but how it is produced, that is, how it is that human beings create their own 
nature and their world. 
The key concept here is habitualization. This is the tendency towards 
repetition and the instauration of routine patterns proper of human action, 
by means of which “choices are narrowed” (Berger and Luckmann 1967, 53) 
and the direction and specialization of activity is attained. The social order 
emerges as a result of the institutionalization of habitualized actions, that 
is, of the typification of actions by types of actors, through the reciprocal 
assignation of motives. Since these typifications are available to anyone in 
the group, they serve to control and direct human conduct generating a way 
to predict each other´s actions. When they have to be transmitted to the 
new generations, institutions become crystallized as if they had a reality of 
their own that “confronts the individual as an external and coercive fact.” 
(Berger and Luckmann 1967, 58) This is the moment of objectivation, which 
is followed by the consequent reabsorption of the world that has been thus 
constructed by each individual, which is called internalization. Only at this 
point language enters into the picture, as well as the symbolic universes of 
myth, knowledge systems and moral values, which appear as legitimation 
instances that must explain and justify the created order to the new gen-
erations. Symbolic universes provide a unified narrative of the meaning of 
institutionalized actions, which gradually constitutes the pre-theoretical 
knowledge of the social world that all share and take for granted, and which 
regulates behavior. This common horizon of meaning not only provides the 
necessary orientation for survival and social life integrating individual into 
a shared frame, but also gives coherence and plausibility to the totality of 
the social order, as wells as to each individual life (Berger and Luckmann 
1967, 84–94). 
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The problem is that this theory has not been able to show that the 
origin of this common horizon of meaning that confers coherence and 
sense to collective and personal life is a product of externationalization. 
Rather, it has revealed that significant human action cannot be conceived 
without presupposing a horizon of meaning into which it is integrated. 
For the actions that are to be typified are already the significant actions of 
previously socialized actors. Interestingly, Berger and Luckmann recognize 
this before describing institutionalization: 
We are thus for the moment excluding the cases of Adam and Eve, or of two 
“feral” children meeting in a clearing of a primeval jungle. But we are assuming 
that the two individuals arrive at their meeting place from social worlds that 
have been historically produced in segregation from each other, and that the 
interaction therefore takes place in a situation that has not been institutionally 
defined for either of the participants. (Berger and Luckmann 1967, 56) 
What is then the point of the theory? Clearly, the origin of the social order 
has not been explained as emerging from human action. All that has been 
described is how a new social order can emerge from the interaction of 
actors belonging to previous universes of meaning. Maybe this is all that 
social construction means: the transformation and reconfiguration of 
social reality starting from both biological and anthropological constants, 
as well as from pre-given universes of meaning. But the pre-eminence of 
meaning over human action reveals something about both the nature of 
action and the foundational character of meaning: its transcendence, which 
is just what the religious awareness discovers. The common reference in 
indigenous cultures to myth as the Word of origin, as well as the Biblical 
account of creation through Logos, points in this direction. Human primordial 
world-openness and plasticity not only generate biological needs, but are 
also signs of transcendence. A fundamental order of meaning has to be 
received, discovered and followed for human action to become significant 
in the relevant way that allows it to participate in the social construction 
of reality (cf. Pannenberg 1985, 513, 321, 395, 513). 
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3. Historical contingency and the action of the Spirit 
How does this the transcendence of meaning relate to historicity? The 
contingent character of our belief systems, modes of being human and forms 
of life, we have seen, cannot be reduced to arbitrariness, self-reference and 
dark beginnings. However, as socio-constructionists claim, they are neither 
inevitable, nor necessary, and they are open to permanent transformation 
and re-construction. This openness, nonetheless, is not self-sustaining. 
It always presupposes an order of meaning that directs the process, as well 
as and order of being in relation to which the process can be carried out. 
Historicity is this open-ended process of reconstruction guided by meaning 
in which human beings take part. How can we understand this process? 
To finish I would like to offer some suggestions, which need further elabo-
ration, aimed at reinterpreting the most significant socio-constructionist 
insights from a theistic perspective. 
To be guided by meaning should not be understood in a deterministic 
sense, as if history were programed to follow certain pre-established path. 
On the contrary, the plasticity of human behavior, due to its biological 
underdetermination, requires that humans construct the meaning of their 
environment and their lives taking resources from both natural (genetic) 
and cultural sources of “information” (Hefner 1993, 146). I agree with Philip 
Hefner’s claim that “myth and ritual are the chief carriers of the information 
that motivates and interprets the behaviour beyond the biogenetic” (Hefner 
1993, 149). As foundational orders of meaning, as we have seen, they cannot 
be reduced to some pre-significant type of action or practice. This irreduc-
ibility gives the perspective of the believer hermeneutical priority: in myth 
and ritual the divine manifests itself to human beings. They provide the 
orientations and models for human life, which however are historical. This 
means that instead of simply disclosing what human beings are once and 
for all, they open a direction for human becoming. In religious narratives 
and practices an invitation is issued and a task is set for humans to realize 
and become what they are called to be. For this reason, human becoming 
is always a participative and co-creative responsibility and task. 
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As Wolfhart Pannenberg has shown, this is a central aspect in the 
Christian understanding of human beings as historical creatures. Contrary to 
the Greek identification of the truly real with eternal, immutable essences, 
the belief in the New Creation, and particularly the notion of the “second 
man” (Cor. 15: 47), implies a radical new understanding of the human 
person, not as confined to a fixed nature, but as a project oriented towards 
the eschatological future in which we will reach the plenitude of our being 
(Pannenberg 1985, 496–502). Human historicity thus implies that human 
existence is decided in and through the events of a concrete history, rather 
than by an essential nature. But this openness requires, as the condition for 
the very historical production of human identity, the awareness of a totality 
of meaning that provides unity to each subject and to the very process of 
history (Pannenberg 1985, 514). 
Like for socio-constructionist, narratives provide this totality of mean-
ing. But while for them the narrative constitution of human reality is the 
clearest sign of its lack of foundations, from a Theistic perspective it is an 
indication of the historical action of the Spirit in human life. Let us examine 
this assertion. 
For socio-constructionist the power that practices have to “produce 
reality” (even though it is differently interpreted in each theory) refers to 
their capacity to structure experience, identity, subjectivity and the body 
through historically contingent concepts and categories. Thus, the productive 
character of practices, their creative power, consists in a sort of imposition 
of structure and arbitrary characteristics into a reality that lacks any inner 
nature and lets itself be shaped at will by human actions and interpretations. 
Burr summarizes this view when she affirms that language “provides us with 
a system of categories for dividing up our experience and giving it meaning, 
so that our very selves become the products of language. Language produces 
and constructs our experience of each other and ourselves” (2003, 62).
In a more radical sense, this means –as Michel Foucault puts it– that 
the very objects of discourse are not simply there ready to be grasped, used 
and conceptualized, but emerge from the complex net of relationships that 
make it possible to speak of and deal with them (1972, 46). So there is no 
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need for raw material that supports construction. In his words: “We sought 
the unity of discourse in the objects themselves […] in what is given to 
the speaking subjects; and in the end, we are sent back to a setting-up of 
relations that characterizes discursive practice itself; and what we discover 
is neither a configuration, nor a form, but a group of rules that are immanent 
in a practice, and define it in its specificity”. (1972, 46)2
But this displaces the question to: what kind of reality do our reali-
ty-constructing discursive practices have? And where do they derive their 
reality from? Radical socio-constructionism not only denies all real alterity, 
all otherness in reality (which is an irony for theories that want to defend 
and exalt multiplicity, difference and marginality), putting human action 
at the center of reality (which is paradoxical for philosophies that aim at 
overcoming the primacy of modern conceptions of the subject, its autonomy 
and foundational character); but it also postulates as real something that 
cannot ontologically ground itself. If language is an ever changing closed 
system not connected with the world, neither can power relations produce 
it, nor can it constitute domination strategies or have any causal power 
whatsoever to affect reality. For the existence of a world with its own mode 
of being is a condition for any causal power or productivity of language and 
discourse, a world that includes us as well as our language, our knowledge 
and our forms of life. We are part of and participants in reality, and thus 
even our ways of interpreting and transforming it count as the way things 
really are (cf. Elder Vass 2012, 247; Evers 2015).
It is no doubt paradoxical to claim that our discourses totally construct 
their objects assuming, simultaneously, that we can study discursive orders, 
that is, that we can analyze the way in which certain objects have emerged 
2 Interestingly, Foucault explains that referents are not completely lost for him. He recog-
nizes that a “history of the referent is no doubt possible; and I have no wish at the outset 
to exclude any effort to uncover and free these ‘prediscursive’ experiences from the tyran-
ny of the text. But what we are concerned with here is not to neutralize discourse, to make 
it the sign of something else […] but to make it emerge in its own complexity.” (1972, 47) 
This approach, as a methodological principle that abstracts discourse from its wider entan-
glements in reality, has certainly opened a fruitful and insightful path for contemporary 
thought. But a methodological strategy does not justify the jump unto ontological con-
clusions. 
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as objects of discourse. Are the studied discursive orders also constructed 
by the new meta-discourse that attempts to study them? –Here again an 
infinite regress and the issue of the epistemological validity of radical 
socio-constructionist theories loom. Discursive processes of social con-
struction must themselves be as independently real as anything can be, if 
they, one the one hand, have the causal power they are claimed to have to 
shape reality, and on the other, if they can be studied. 
The irreducible alterity of reality, which both resists certain inter-
pretations and includes our multiple life forms and dynamic interactions 
with the environment, complements the transcendence of meaning we 
discovered before. Human practices cannot be completely self-generative and 
self-sustaining, but presuppose an order of meaning and an order of being 
that precede and ground our dynamics of interpretative and reconstructive 
participation in reality. Moreover, it is the alterity of reality that keeps 
linguistic reference open, since reality cannot be fully and wholly grasped 
in concepts. The permanent transformation of our worldviews, theories and 
cultural configurations is just a manifestation of the permanent dynamic 
character of our relation to the world. Thus, the contingency of human 
historicity should not be interpreted as a sentence to perpetual intellectual 
homelessness, due to the impermanence and arbitrariness of every belief 
system and universe of meaning. On the contrary, it may be seen as the 
expression of the relational character of reality of which we form part. 
Moreover, the historical production of worldviews and modes of being 
human, which is narrative based, can only work by means of anticipations 
of meaning. This is, by integrating all particularities in bigger pictures from 
which they receive their significance. The basic interpretations of the world 
and ourselves that this pictures offer always have a mythical character, in that 
they provide an order of meaning that is assumed and cannot be grounded 
or reduced to anything else. Even a picture of reality as mere flux and con-
tingency is a picture in this sense, but it has the insuperable disadvantage of 
assigning to human practice what it cannot do on its own: to ground reality. 
On the contrary, the totality of meaning that theistic narratives and 
practices offer makes it possible to participate in the construction of reality 
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as co-creators (Hefner 1993). This is so because they imply both discovering 
“the presence of the true and definitive amid the processes of history that 
always break off uncompleted” (Pannenberg 1985, 519), and the task to 
achieve the unity of history acting in it with an orientation towards the 
salvific future. Thus, 
If the human race is to be a formative process leading to a fulfilled humanity, 
it can be such only under the guidance of divine providence. 
This guidance need not, of course, be understood as a determination of 
events prior to the actual course of history […] Rather, an understanding of God 
as the goal of history and […] and understanding of God’s aims in dealing with 
humankind can inspire their anticipation of the final form of human identity 
and thus the orientational framework in which they decide on the goals of their 
own action. (Pannenberg 1985, 515)
The contingency of human historicity, the fact that human beings need to 
participate in their own self-constitution and that our constructions are 
always transient and changeable, can be interpreted as the open space for 
God’s action in the human world. Because “God strives for and reaches his 
ends not apart from human beings but with the cooperation of his crea-
tures and through the conflicts between human purposes and interests.” 
(Pannenberg 1985, 515) In this connection, a theistic reinterpretation of 
social construction can be developed, which both avoids the aporias of its 
radical forms and enriches the Christian understanding of human beings as 
historical creatures, this is, as created co-creators guided by transcendent 
meaning. 
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